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The dispatching of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 
(SMM) to Ukraine in 2014 has (again) brought to the fore the 
importance of appropriate legal status for the OSCE and its 
staff (see also the contribution of Christian Tomuschat). 
While before the Ukraine crisis the OSCE may have laid 
relatively dormant, the events in Ukraine allowed the 
organization to reclaim its position as a pan-European 
security forum. However, in the absence of a clear legal 
status in relation to the OSCE, the deployment of the OSCE 
SMM in Ukraine was not self-evident. A precious ten weeks 
were lost before a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the OSCE and Ukraine, pertaining to the mission’s legal 
status, was signed and ratified and all arrangements for the 
SMM were in place. As the Panel of Eminent Persons, 
established in the wake of the OSCE’s deployment in Ukraine, 
denounced in 2015, eight OSCE monitors were abducted and 
held incommunicado, and the SMM was not able to ‘open 
bank accounts, enter into contracts, issue vehicle number 
plates or import equipment – some of it vital for security’. In 
light of these limitations, the Panel strongly urged the 
participating States to confer legal status and personality on 
the OSCE. However, as such calls have been launched before, 
it is unclear whether the OSCE participating States will act 
on its latest iteration and adopt the 2007 Draft OSCE 
Convention, which governs the organization’s legal 
personality, capacity, privileges and immunities.
Given that it is not likely that general legal status will be 
conferred on the OSCE under treaty law any time soon, it is 
worth mining other international law sources for this legal 
status. In this respect, it is known that the OSCE Secretariat 
relies on general customary international law, although it 
appears to be aware of the relative weakness of this 
argument. In this post, I explore, alternatively but relatedly, 
whether granting legal status could possibly be derived from 
an institutional duty of loyalty of OSCE participating States’ 
vis-à-vis the organization, i.e., a norm of intra-institutional 
customary law.
A customary institutional duty of loyalty?
By virtue of the duty of loyalty, member States and the 
organization which they have established – in this case the 
OSCE – should assist each other in carrying out their 
respective tasks, particularly by the founding documents of 
the international organization. This principle of cooperation 
is best known in its EU version as the principle of ‘sincere 
cooperation’ between the EU and its member States, but it 
also exists within the UN, at least in the relationship between 
the UN Security Council and the member States. As 
(participating) States have tasked the OSCE with carrying out 
a mandate to comprehensively realize security in the pan-
European area, an argument can be made that they owe it to 
the organization to endow it with the necessary legal status 
in order to enable it to effectively carry out this mandate (e.g., 
when the OSCE authorizes the deployment of monitoring 
missions on the territory of a participating State).
This argument may appear sensible, but the first problem we 
encounter is that the principle of OSCE/participating State 
cooperation is, unlike as is the case with the EU, not 
explicitly laid down in a founding document of the OSCE. 
Even if it had been laid down, it would not have been legally 
binding on the participating States, as any commitments 
within the OSCE context are meant to be only political in 
nature. Accordingly, the existence of an inherent principle of 
loyal cooperation between the organization and its 
member/participating States may have to be established 
under customary international law, which is, again, not self-
evident.
An additional complication is that the character of the OSCE 
as an organization separate from its participating States may 
be put in doubt, as a result of which the question of State-
organization loyalty may be moot. Indeed, in the absence of 
unambiguous legal personality of the OSCE, it may well be 
submitted that all OSCE action in fact amounts to joint action 
by the aggregated OSCE participating States, which simply 
use the OSCE as a transparent vehicle to pursue their aims. 
In such a constellation, in which the organization disappears 
from view as an independent entity, the duty of loyalty may 
possibly not be applicable. Still, one may have to bear in mind 
that the questions of international legal personality and 
domestic legal status are distinct. This means that an 
organization which cannot avail itself of the former can still 
be entitled to the latter. These concepts speak to different 
rights and obligations indeed: international legal personality 
is mainly concerned with questions of responsibility (the 
right to bring and receive international claims against and 
from other international legal subjects, States in particular), 
whereas legal status mainly pertains with privileges and 
immunities in States’ domestic legal order. Thus, even when 
lacking international legal personality, the OSCE can still 
claim to be an organization that is entitled to domestic legal 
status, and it may be argued on this basis that participating 
States have a duty of loyal cooperation to realize this status.
A matter of effectiveness
Admittedly, a duty to grant legal status does not as a matter 
of course flow from the principle of cooperation, but a 
proper argument in this sense can surely be made. As it is a 
core function of the OSCE to send missions to the territory 
of its participating states, a failure on the part of 
participating States to facilitate these missions through a 
legal status grant may hamper the overall effectiveness of the 
organization in fulfilling its mandate, and hence it may 
amount to a violation of the principle of cooperation.
What specific privileges and immunities this legal status 
exactly entails is ultimately a function of 
organizational/mission effectiveness, balanced with the 
legitimate interests of States, which cannot be expected to 
place the OSCE and its officials entirely outside the normal 
remit of its law. This tension between institutional and 
national considerations is normally resolved through 
negotiations resulting in bilateral or multilateral agreements, 
or unilateral commitments. Then, obviously, we are back to 
square one: the need to have a detailed arrangement on the 
OSCE’s legal status in force, such as the 2007 Draft 
Convention. However, as the Draft Convention has been 
drawn up within the OSCE itself, and no principled 
opposition against the content of the its norms has emerged, 
one may possibly argue that the Draft Convention is a more 
specific embodiment of the general duty of cooperation 
between participating States and the OSCE. Accordingly, one 
could advance that compliance with the principles of the 
Draft Convention is already an obligation resting on the 
participating States, irrespective of its formal adoption and 
entry into force. Obviously, to dispel any uncertainty, the 
latter is highly desirable. Yet in the scenario that it were not 
to materialize – which is, unfortunately, due to the 
politicization of the matter, not fanciful – an argument based 
on the particularized duty of loyalty may hold sufficient legal 
water.
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